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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Hubbard pied guilty to failure to register.

However, at sentencing, the

district court made several comments evidencing its intent to impose a harsher
sentence premised on the underlying lewd and lascivious charges because it felt
California had been too lenient when it sentenced Mr. Hubbard in that regard.

The

Idaho district court did not trust California to keep Mr. Hubbard in prison (which the
Idaho district court believed necessary, but which the California superior court, in its
discretion, had suspended), and so the Idaho district court decided to go above and
beyond the recommendation of the State and impose a significant prison sentence in
the California superior court's stead. In doing so, the Idaho district court committed a
fundamental error, violating Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections
against double jeopardy. As such, his sentence should be vacated and a more lenient
sentence imposed.
Additionally, the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline
Mr. Hubbard's Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) to strike statements
which tended to indicate that he had two lewd and lascivious charges in his criminal
record. The record demonstrates that such statements are erroneous and unreliable
because Mr. Hubbard only had one such charge in his record.

As such, this Court

should remand this case so that the PSI may be properly redlined and the record made
clear.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hubbard entered a guilty plea to the charge of failure to register. (Tr., p.17,
Ls.9-13.) In doing so, he freely admitted that the reason he did not register was that he
1

was absconding from supervision in California. (Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) California
secured a governor's warrant to extradite Mr. Hubbard back to its jurisdiction. (See Tr.,
p.26, Ls.1-5.)

Pursuant to Mr. Hubbard's plea agreement with Idaho, the prosecutor

recommended that for failing to register, the district court should impose a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. (Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15.) Defense counsel,
recognizing that California was going to pursue the parole violation (as it had secured
the governor's warrant), recommended a unified sentence of five years, with only one
year fixed, for the failure to register charge and argued that Idaho should let California
bear the cost of Mr. Hubbard's continued incarceration. (Tr., p.26, L.1 - p.27, L.5.)
The district court, however, chose to focus on the facts relating to the offense
which led to Mr. Hubbard's qualification under the registration law, rather than the facts
relating to the offense for which he was appearing in its courtroom.

(See Tr., p.29,

L.16 - p.33, L.55.) The Idaho district court criticized Mr. Hubbard's explanation of those
underlying yet unrelated offenses:
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this
case.
(Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19.) It expressed its distrust of the competency
of the California superior court to "properly" address his sentence on those charges:
I suspect that the [Idaho] taxpayer would just as soon as pay the cost to
make sure that you're locked up and not trust California to do what it's
supposed to do. You have four L&L's [sic], you pied to two, and they put
you on five years probation . . . . [You c]ontinually violated your parole.
They let you out. You violate. Put you back in. You violate. So I don't
feel comfortable trusting California to not allow you out again.

2

(Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).)

It discussed its

perspectives in regard to the investigation surrounding a second potential victim: "And
there was a second person who came and made allegations, whether [Mr. Hubbard]
was actually convicted or not. And I've also found that people can pass polygraphs all
over the place .... [T]hey are not accurate." 1 (Tr., p.33, Ls.20-25.) Based on these
considerations, rather than on the facts surrounding Mr. Hubbard's failure to register,
the district court decided that it would not follow the plea agreement and imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.

As part of its sentence, it also

imposed the maximum permissible fine of $5,000 and an additional $975.50 in costs,
including $375 for the Victim's Compensation fund, $350 for the public defender, and
up to $100 for the presentence investigation. (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.1; R., pp.38-40.)
Based on I. C. § 18-8311, the sentence was executed and made consecutive to his
sentence from California. (Tr., p.33, Ls. 7-11.)
Mr. Hubbard filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35), and he was given leave to file new information.

(R., p.37.)

However, no new evidence was filed and the district court denied the motion.
(R., pp.45-49.)

In addition to reiterating its extensive consideration of the underlying

Defense counsel had already clarified that there was no conviction in regard to the
second alleged victim and Mr. Hubbard had passed a polygraph examination in regard
to those allegations. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.) In fact, Mr. Hubbard had objected to the
presentation of that information in his PSI. (PSI, p.228; Tr., p.20, Ls.17-21 (defense
counsel stating that he submitted objections to the PSI in writing and the district court
indicating that those objections had been made part of the record.) The PSI presented
the information in such a way as to make it appear as though Mr. Hubbard had more
felony convictions for lewd and lascivious conduct than he actually did. (PSI, pp.4, 14.)
The district court made no indication on the PSI document itself indicating that the
information regarding those particular incidents was unreliable or open to severe
misinterpretation. (See PSI, pp.4, 14.)
1

3

lewd and lascivious charges, the district court added, "The Court also weighed the
necessity to protect society from future similar crimes [lewd and lascivious acts]. The
Court found that in order to deter future such crimes by [Mr.] Hubbard, this sentence
was necessary. There is a need to deter [Mr.] Hubbard from such behavior." (R., p.47.)
With that attempt to justify its excessive sentence, the district court denied the Rule 35
motion. (R., pp.47-48.)

4

ISSUES
1. Whether the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's right to be free from double
jeopardy when it imposed a sentence in this case premised on the belief that
California had been too lenient in its initial sentencing on the underlying offenses.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by focusing intently and almost
exclusively on Mr. Hubbard's other offenses for which he had already been
punished instead of the facts of the charge at issue when it imposed a sentence
in the case before it.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to redline the unreliable
and erroneous statements regarding Mr. Hubbard's criminal history from the PSI.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. Hubbard's Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy
When It Imposed A Sentence In This Case Premised On The Belief That California Had
Been Too Lenient In Its Initial Sentencing On The Underlying Offenses

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for several lewd and lascivious conduct

charges by a California superior court. However, when he failed to register in Idaho, the
Idaho district court criticized the California court's sentencing approach. As it discussed
that issue and those underlying charges (which were not pending before it, nor even
within its jurisdiction), the Idaho district court essentially resentenced Mr. Hubbard on
those underlying charges, rather than on the charge currently pending before it. Based
on its perception that the California superior court could not be trusted to "properly"
incarcerate Mr. Hubbard, the Idaho district court imposed a harsher sentence in
this case.

In doing so, the district court violated Mr. Hubbard's state and federal

constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.

B.

The District Court's Violation Of The Protection Against Double Jeopardy
Constitutes Fundamental Error And May Be Raised For The First Time On
Appeal 2
When the district court violated the state and federal constitutional provisions

against double jeopardy, it committed a fundamental error.

2

And while the appellate

The Court of Appeals did consider this question in regard to a very similar abuse
perpetrated by this same district court some six years ago. See State v. Lee, 2005
Unpublished Opinion No. 534 (Ct. App. 2005). It declined to provide relief for that
abuse. However, as an unpublished opinion, the Lee opinion is not controlling
precedent. See id. Furthermore, its analysis predates the Idaho Supreme Court's
landmark decision in State v. Perry, which redefined the necessary analysis in regard to
6

court will generally not address issues not presented below, if the error is fundamental,
it may be argued for the first time on appeal and the appellate court will rule on the
merits of the argument.

See, e.g., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-25 (2008).

Fundamental error is analyzed by a three-prong test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in
most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 (internal citations omitted). In this case, all three prongs are
present, and therefore, this Court should remedy the district court's fundamental error.

1. The District Court's Actions, Which Were Tantamount To Resentencing
Mr. Hubbard For The Underlying Crime Instead Of The Current Charge,
Violated His Unwaived Right To Be Free From Double Jeopardy

The United States Constitution provides that "No person shall be ... subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The federal protection against double jeopardy has been incorporated against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717

(1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802-03 (1989).
The Idaho Constitution provides the same protection as the federal constitution. IDAHO
CONST. Art. I, § 13. Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with its
federal counterpart. State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001).
These protections can be violated in three ways:

(1) engaging in a second

prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered; (2) engaging in a

the fundamental error doctrine. See Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2008). Therefore, this issue
7

second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been entered; and
(3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117,129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. The district court's violation in
this case is an example of the third form of violation. The Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized that, even if the punishments imposed are authorized by the Legislature,
imposing them in a second proceeding violates the double jeopardy protections. State

v. Avelar, 132 Idaho 775, 778 (1999). 3 There is also nothing in the record indicating
that Mr. Hubbard waived his state and federal constitutional protections in this regard.
Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for the underlying charges by the appropriate
court in California, where all the relevant acts took place. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.131-32
(the Judgment of Conviction entered by the California superior court).) In its discretion,
the California superior court suspended the imposition of an underlying sentence and,
instead, imposed a five-year term of probation. 4 (PSI, p.131; see also pp.133-37 (the

needs to be reconsidered in light of the new controlling precedent that is on point.
The Idaho Supreme Court cited to United States v. Halper to support this conclusion.
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper held that the State may not seek a civil penalty that is for
retributive, as opposed to remedial, purposes in a proceeding separate from the
proceeding in which the criminal penalty was imposed because doing so constitutes a
second punishment and so violates the protections against double jeopardy. Halper,
490 U.S. at 448-49. Halper, however, has been subsequently abrogated because it
deviated from traditional double jeopardy analyses. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 99, 101 (1997). It failed to make the threshold determination of whether the civil
penalties were so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties, thus bringing
them within the realm of the double jeopardy protections, and to assess the statute
under which the sanctions were imposed, as opposed to the character of the sanctions
themselves. Id. The Hudson abrogation, however, only attacks the Halper Court's
consideration of the penalties themselves, not the conclusion that imposing them at a
second proceeding would violate the double jeopardy protections. See id. As such, the
Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Avelar survives Hudson, so long as the additional
penalties are appropriately within the scope of the double jeopardy protections.
Imposing more extensive prison sentences are definitely within the scope of those
protections.
4 The California superior court had the discretion to delay imposing or executing a
sentence for a period of probation not exceeding the maximum time permitted for a
3
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order suspending the sentence and setting forth the terms of probation).) That court
also found Mr. Hubbard to be in violation of his probation in 2005, at which point, in its
discretion, it revoked Mr. Hubbard's probation and executed a six-year sentence. (PSI,
p.156.) Neither of those decisions appears to be beyond its statutory authority to make.
See Cal. Penal Code§§ 288(a), 1203.1 (a). 5
Nevertheless, the Idaho district court, displeased with the California superior
court's exercise of its discretion, determined that "I don't feel comfortable trusting
California to not allow you out again."

(Tr., p.32, Ls.4-6.)

The Idaho district court

continued:
I'm not going to go through all of the--everything that's in this presentence
report. But it is really clear that the prosecutor has nailed it. 6 You blame
the victim in this case, and according to her statements, that abuse started
when she was six years old. And there was a second person who came
and made a/legations, whether he was convicted or not. And I've also
found that people can pass polygraphs all over the place. 7
(Tr., p.33, Ls.15-24 (emphasis added to provide one of many examples of the district
court's focus on the underlying crime, rather than the charge pending before it).) The

sentence under the law. Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1 (a). California requires a three, six,
or eight year prison term for such convictions. See Cal. Penal Code § 288(a).
Therefore, the five year period of probation was within the California superior court's
discretion to impose in that case. See Cal. Penal Code§ 1203.1 (a).
5 He was subsequently released on parole. (See, e.g., PSI, p.143.)
6 The prosecutor comments in this regard consist of quoting from a letter Mr. Hubbard
wrote to the victim's mother in which he discussed his views of the underlying offense at
that time. (See Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.13.) The letter is included in the PSI
immediately following the police reports and immediately preceding the judgment of
conviction in the underlying case, indicating that it was written at the time the underlying
case was proceeding (which was some ten years ago). (See PSI, pp.124-32.)
7 This statement indicates that the district court felt that Mr. Hubbard had hoodwinked its
counterpart from California, earning a more lenient sentence because he had been
deliberately deceptive on a polygraph. (See Tr., p.33, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Hubbard had
taken and passed that polygraph in regard to accusations from a second potential victim
(i.e., answered truthfully, denying those allegations).
(See Tr., p.31, Ls.13-22.)
According to Mr. Hubbard, there was not a second conviction at that time, but there was
a revocation of his probation. (Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.)
9

Idaho district court's statements reveal that it felt that its counterpart from California had
somehow abused its discretion (although there has been no showing that it had done
so) and been too lenient in its dealings with Mr. Hubbard. (See, e.g., Tr., p.30, L.22 p.32, L.6.) It proceeded to impose the sentence it did to punish Mr. Hubbard for those
underlying offenses. (See, e.g., Tr., p.33, Ls.9-25.)
As such, the Idaho district court imposed an impermissible second punishment
for the same offense. See, e.g., Avelar, 132 Idaho at 778. This violated Mr. Hubbard's
unwaived state and federal constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy.

2. The Error Is Clear And Obvious Based On The Appellate Record
Mr. Hubbard was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. (R., p.18.)
The applicable statutes only require the State to prove that Mr. Hubbard was subject to
the code sections and that he failed to provide certain information to the State within
the requisite time frame.

See I.C. § 18-8307. It does not require an investigation or

disclosure of the underlying offense. See id. The inquiry is separate and distinct from
the underlying prosecution. 8

See id.; I.C. § 18-8311.

The punishment for failing to

register is separate from that of the underlying prosecution.

See I.C. § 18-8311

(particularly noting the fact that if the defendant was on probation (i.e., already
separately punished) 9 when he failed to register, the district court's discretion to order
probation or retain jurisdiction is removed).

8

This is particularly true in this case, since the Idaho district court would have no
jurisdiction over the acts committed in Trinity County, California.
9 Mr. Hubbard recognizes that the statute does not clarify whether the probation is for
the underlying offense or some other offense, but would assert that, as this section is
predicated on a prior offense, the period of probation may be reasonably construed to
include probation for the underlying offense. See I.C. § 18-8311. As such, the statute
itself does recognize that this is a separate and distinct punishment from that for the
underlying crime. See id.
10

Therefore, when the Idaho district court focused on the facts of the underlying
offense and based the sentence on those facts (rather than those relating to
Mr. Hubbard's failure to register), it went well beyond the scope of the governing
statutes. 10 The error is clear from the statements the district court made at sentencing.

(See Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.34, L.9.)
For example, the district court berated Mr. Hubbard, saying:
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this
case.
(Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) Most interestingly, the
district court refers to "the victim in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19.) "This case" is a
failure to register case. (R., pp.4-5.) The only victim in a failure to register case is the
state; there is no specific victim. (See, e.g., PSI, p.2.) There is certainly not a victim
who Mr. Hubbard can blame. In fact, he did not blame Idaho for his failure to register:
"I was absconding, so I wasn't even looking up the laws or anything. I was trying to get
[a friend] up here to the VA hospital and get gone, get back to California. So I didn't
even bother looking it up. [I] was being a big dummy." (Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) He
accepted responsibility for his actions and did not blame the State of Idaho for his
failure. (See Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.)
Therefore, the only victim to whom the Idaho district court could possibly be
referring is the victim in the underlying lewd and lascivious case. The fact that it refers

10

In trying to justify this position, the district court wrote in the denial of the Rule 35
motion that the sentence was necessary to deter "future similar crimes." (R., p.47.) It
had discussed the lewd and lascivious convictions immediately before making that
statement, which would make lewd and lascivious acts the "future similar crimes" to be
deterred, as opposed to failure to register. (R., p.47.)
11

to her as the victim "in this case" is critical and clearly demonstrates the error.
(Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) "This case" is not the lewd and lascivious case,
yet the district court behaved as if it were.

Therefore, the sentence it imposed was

premised on the lewd and lascivious case, not the failure to register charge, and thus,
clearly violated Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections against double
jeopardy.
And while consideration of the defendant's criminal record may be permissible at
sentencing, the district court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the judgment
of another court. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1999)
(recognizing that the sentencing court has broad discretion, which will not be interfered
with absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion). 11

It is impermissible to

remedy any dissatisfaction with the severity of a sentence imposed by another court
by punishing the defendant again for those same offenses.

State v. Findeisen, 133

Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999). Because, based on its comments, that is exactly what
the district court did to Mr. Hubbard, its error is clear from the record. (See, e.g., Tr.,
p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6.)

11

Even though this sentence was imposed by a California court, it must be treated to
have the same effect as a sentence imposed by an Idaho court, as a failure to do so
would violate the full faith and credit provisions of the federal Constitution. See, e.g.,
State v. Howard, 150 Idaho 471, 4 77-78 (2011 ). Therefore, as the California superior
court's actions were within its discretion, it is not the place of the Idaho district court to
substitute its judgment and impose a different sentence in place of its counterpart's
permissible judgment. See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229-230 (Ct. App.
1999); Flores v. Lodge, 101 Idaho 533, 534 (1980) (holding that, in a habeas
proceeding, it would be improper for the judgment of a Fourth District Court to be
substituted for the proper judgment imposed by a Third District Court).
12

3. The Error Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings By Resulting In A
Harsher Sentence
The Idaho district court's decision that the California superior court could not be
trusted to do its job led directly to the Idaho district court's decision to impose a
sentence that went beyond even the recommendation of the prosecutor, the
community's representative in these proceedings. (See Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.32, L.1.) The
prosecutor was able to consider Mr. Hubbard's past record, including those underlying
lewd and lascivious charges, while keeping that consideration as a part of the
discussion regarding the failure to register allegation. (See Tr., p.22, L.2 - p.25, L.2.)
Based on its consideration of the appropriate factors, the prosecutor recommended a
unified sentence of ten years, with only three years fixed, for Mr. Hubbard's failure to
register. 12 (Tr., p.25, Ls.3-6.)
Contrarily, the district court improperly focused on the facts of the underlying
offense, and based on that improper focus, imposed a unified sentence of ten years
with five years fixed.

(Tr., p.32, L.20 - p.33, L.1.)

In addition, it also imposed the

maximum permissible fine of $5,000 and an additional $975.50 in costs, including $375
for the Victim's Compensation fund, $350 for the public defender, and up to $100 for the
presentence investigation. (Tr., p.32, L.25 - p.33, L.1; R., pp.38-40.) This demonstrates
that the district court's error, its violation of Mr. Hubbard's protection against double
jeopardy by imposing a second sentence for his underlying conduct, affected the
outcome of his case.
Therefore, as all three Perry prongs are present, this violation constitutes a
fundamental error, which this Court should remedy.

12

The fact that he was willing to agree to this recommendation evidences his belief that
this sentence would serve all the sentencing objectives.
13

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Focusing Intently And Almost
Exclusively On Mr. Hubbard's Other Offenses For Which He Had Already Been
Punished Instead Of The Facts Of The Charge At Issue When It Imposed A Sentence In
The Case Before It

A.

Introduction
Even if this Court finds that the district court did not violate Mr. Hubbard's

constitutional protections against double jeopardy, it should nevertheless conclude that
the district court's intense and almost exclusive consideration of the facts surrounding
Mr. Hubbard's past offenses, rather than the facts surrounding his current offense,
represents an abuse of discretion. This Court should remedy that abuse.

B.

The District Court's Improper Focus On The Facts Of An Already-Adjudicated
Case, Rather Than The Facts Of The Case Pending Before It Caused It To
Impose An Excessive Sentence In An Abuse Of Its Discretion
While the district court does have wide discretion to consider various information

at sentencing, including the defendant's criminal history, it does not have the discretion
to "essentially impose[] sentence for offenses other than the one that was before the
court." Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229. This is particularly true if the defendant is already
subject to a criminal sentence for those other offenses. Id. at 230. The evidence of
such an abuse of discretion may be found by looking at the comments of the court
and/or prosecutor to see whether they are intensely and almost exclusively focused on
the other offenses, rather than the pending charge. See id. at 229-30. The fact that
they are dissatisfied with the severity of the sentence imposed by the other court does
not, however, authorize the district court to impose a harsher sentence for those acts.
Id. at 230.
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The district court in this case did exactly what the Court of Appeals found
inappropriate in Findeisen. It stated unequivocally:
I suspect that the [Idaho] taxpayer would just as soon as pay the cost to
make sure that you're locked up and not trust California to do what it's
supposed to do. You have four L&L's [sic], you pied to two, and they put
you on five years probation .... [You c]ontinually violated your parole.
They let you out. You violate. Put you back in. You violate. So I don't
feel comfortable trusting California to not allow you out again.
(Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1; p.32, Ls.2-6 (emphasis added).) The district court in this
case was dissatisfied with the lenient sentence the California superior court imposed for
the lewd and lascivious offenses in its discretion.

And so it usurped that court's

responsibility and imposed a harsher sentence, despite the current sentence that
Mr. Hubbard was already serving for those offenses. 13
For that, and all the other reasons set forth in Section I, it is clear that the district
court, at the very least, abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Hubbard's sentence
while focused intently and almost exclusively on the facts of his other offenses, rather
than the facts of the case pending before it. This Court should remedy that abuse.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Redline The Unreliable And
Erroneous Statements Regarding Mr. Hubbard's Criminal History From The PSI
The district court abused its discretion by failing to red line certain parts of the PSI
which, based on the evidence presented, were erroneously included in that report. (See
PSI, pp.4, 14.) The two sections of the PSI relating to Mr. Hubbard's prior criminal
record are written so as to suggest that he had two separate convictions for lewd and
lascivious conduct. (See PSI, pp.4-14.) Mr. Hubbard objected to the inclusion of such
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statements because they are erroneous in light of a complete understanding of the
sentence initially imposed by the California superior court in 2002.

(PSI, p.228; Tr.,

p.20, Ls.18-21 (indicating that defense counsel submitted the objections in writing and
the district court appended them to the PSI).) The imposition of his initial sentence was
suspended for a period of probation (not unlike the withheld judgment process in Idaho).
(PSI, p.131; see also pp.133-37 (the order suspending the sentence and setting forth
the terms of probation).) In 2005, the California superior court revoked that probation
and, for the first time in that case, articulated and imposed a term sentence. (See PSI,
p.156.) As evidenced by the record, Mr. Hubbard only had one lewd and lascivious
charge in his record, and thus, the statements to the contrary are clearly unreliable, and
thus, should be stricken from the PSI. See, e.g., State v. Molen, 148 Idaho 950, 961-62
(Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho 261, 262 n.1 (Ct. App. 1998)).
The reason this is necessary is that the information in this PSI may continue to
be used at future proceedings (i.e., parole hearings), and so the district court needs to
ensure a clear and accurate record is persevered, particularly when information in the
PSI is unreliable. See id. In this case, the references to a "conviction for lewd conduct"
in 2005 are empirically proven to be unreliable and inaccurate, but remain unaltered on
the face of the document, which would tend to indicate that those comments are
reliable. Therefore, those comments needed to be stricken from the record. The failure
to do so constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. See, e.g., State

v. Mauro,

121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991); but see State v. Carey, 274 P.3d 21, 23-24 (Ct. App. 2012)
(holding that, where the defendant's challenges to the PSI do not undermine the

13

Mr. Hubbard was on parole (see, e.g., PSI, p.143), continuing to serve time against
his six-year sentence which was imposed by the California superior court when he
violated the terms of his initial probationary term. (PSI, p.156.)
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reliability or accuracy of the information included in the PSI, redlining is unnecessary).
Since Mr. Hubbard demonstrated that the district court has, in fact, abused its
discretion, this case should be remanded so that the PSI may be properly redlined and
the record made clear. See e.g. Rodriguez, 132 Idaho at 262 n.1.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hubbard respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and
remand his case for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he respectfully requests
that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
He also respectfully requests that, on remand, the district court be instructed to
properly strike the unreliable information in his PSI and make the record clear in that
regard.
DATED this 29 th day of May, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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